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Abstract 
Despite allegations that foreign aid promotes corruption and patronage, little is known about how 
recipient governments’ electoral incentives influence aid spending. The article proposes a distributional 
politics model of aid spending in which governments use their informational advantages over donors in 
order to allocate a disproportionate share of aid to electorally strategic supporters, allowing governments 
to translate aid into votes. To evaluate this argument, the author codes data on the spatial distribution of 
multilateral donor projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010 and show that Kenyan governments have 
consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favor of copartisan and coethnic voters, a bias that 
holds for each of Kenya’s last three regimes. He confirms that aid distribution increases incumbent vote 
share. This evidence suggests that electoral motivations play a significant role in aid allocation and that 
distributional politics may help explain the gap between donor intentions and outcomes.   
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Introduction 
“People are told if they don’t vote EPRDF, then no fertilizers, [and] clinics. If you get sick, 
they don’t get a referral note from the kebele official for hospital in Addis Ababa.” 
—Ethiopian OFDM candidate Bulcha Demeske1  
 
Governments often use aid for political purposes. The quote above refers to Ethiopia shortly 
before the 2010 election, when the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reportedly 
withheld the distribution of foreign aid, including agricultural supplies and food aid, from 
families that failed to vote for his party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF). Despite this abuse, the Zenawi government continued to receive over $3 billion in aid 
distribution each year from 2009 to 2011.
2
 Similar incidents are common in aid dependent states, 
and there is a growing recognition among development scholars that politically motivated 
capture and corruption plays a significant role in aid effectiveness.  Yet surprisingly little is 
known about political incentives shape how, where, and whether foreign aid benefits are 
distributed.  
This article seeks to illuminate these incentives. I argue that electoral strategies play a 
strong and consistent role in aid spending and support this claim by showing that the distribution 
of aid funds in Kenya is biased in favor of an incumbent’s political supporters. I also argue that 
this bias arises because of inefficiencies in aid allocation. Donor agencies often lack information 
about who is most deserving of aid funds and thus delegate to recipient governments 
considerable discretion over the allocation of aid. Incumbents take advantage of this discretion 
                                                 
1
 Human Rights Watch 2010. 
2
 World Bank 2011. 
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and their informational advantages over donors in order to allocate more aid to the voters that are 
most likely to help them win electoral contests.  
In order to test this model of aid politics, I collected and coded a novel data set and used 
existing data on the subnational distribution of World Bank and African Development Bank 
projects in Kenya from 1992 to 2010. These data allow me to precisely estimate the amount of 
aid going to each of Kenya’s 210 electoral constituencies. This detailed spatial variation enables 
a more stringent evaluation of how politics affects aid spending than has heretofore been 
possible. The use of subnational data is particularly novel in the aid politics literature, which has 
largely relied on cross-national data for studying the impact of domestic politics on aid spending.  
 Understanding the effect of electoral incentives on aid spending is particularly important 
given the fact that most aid now goes to electoral democracies.
3
 Elections, even in more 
authoritarian contexts, play a vital role in shaping the spending decisions of incumbents. Yet 
much of the existing work on aid capture and corruption remains surprisingly apolitical and 
rarely takes into account the role of elections in shaping a recipient government’s decisions. In 
part, this gap is due to the limitations of existing aid data—a problem remedied by the new data 
set used in the analysis presented in this article.  
While my conclusions are generalizable to a number of contexts, the empirics are focused 
on Kenya. This case was chosen for several reasons. First, foreign aid in Kenya represents a 
significant portion of public spending, totaling 28 percent of government expenditure in 2009.
4
 
Second, Kenya has held elections every five years since 1992. These elections are often 
contentious and have resulted in two meaningful regime changes during the analysis period. 
                                                 
3
 As of 2010, each of the twenty largest aid recipients (per capita) holds national elections 
(author’s calculations).  
4
 World Bank 2011. 
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Since Kenyan politicians have a high risk of election loss, they should have strong incentives to 
use aid as a way to improve their electoral chances, if possible. These regime changes also 
provide plausibly exogenous variation in the distribution of political support for the ruling 
regime, which allows me to plausibly estimate causal effects.  
I find support for a political model of aid allocation in Kenya and observe a strong bias in 
the allocation of aid toward constituencies with high vote shares for the incumbent. This bias is 
also confirmed when looking at the ethnicity of voters: constituencies that share the ethnicity of 
the incumbent receive consistently higher shares of foreign aid. I rule out alternative 
explanations by taking advantage of changes in the geographic distribution of regimes’ political 
supporters over time. I use a difference-in-differences empirical strategy to establish that when a 
new regime comes to power in Kenya, the geographic distribution of aid spending shifts toward 
the new regime’s support base and frequently away from supporters of the losing regime.  I also 
evaluate whether aid alters election outcomes in Kenya. The results imply that foreign aid helps 
incumbent governments win elections. 
This research contributes to the large and growing debate over the role that corruption 
and governance play in the effectiveness of foreign aid.
5
 Existing literature generally concludes 
that democratic governance and accountability contribute to the effectiveness of foreign aid—a 
position that donors are increasingly taking to heart.
6
  Yet, despite this conclusion, little is known 
about how democratic institutions, such as elections, influence aid spending. Given the growing 
norm of elections in much of the developing world, and the extent to which the donor 
                                                 
5
 Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Svensson 2000; 
Wright and Winters 2010. 
6
  Dollar and Levin 2006. For one example, see the Millennium Challenge Corporation Selection 
Criterion at http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection.   
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community supports these institutions, understanding the effect of electoral institutions on aid 
seems paramount.  
My research contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness and builds upon the 
literature on patronage and government spending incentives in developing states. While studies 
have shown that ethnicity and electoral support shape the distribution of government spending, 
much of the evidence for this effect has relied on individual projects and single regimes, and has 
not considered how outside donor funding is affected by these incentives or whether donor funds 
have similar distributional consequences. In contrast, I study the distribution of funds for 153 
separate foreign aid projects across every regime in Kenya since 1992, when multiparty elections 
were reestablished. These data allow me to provide more precise estimates and more complete 
confirmatory evidence for the role of elections in determining spending patterns. 
Background 
Governments often appear to use aid for electoral ends, yet the effects of electoral incentives on 
aid spending are rarely systematically studied. In addition to the case of Ethiopia discussed 
briefly above, citizens who requested food aid before the 2005 election in Zimbabwe were 
routinely turned away if they could not document their support for the Zimbabwe African 
National Union - Patriotic Front (zanu-PF).
7
 In Pakistan, foreign emergency relief for the 2010 
                                                 
7
 McGreal, Chris. “Mugabe accused of using food as a political weapon in Zimbabwe.” The 
Guardian, June 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/04/unitednations.zimbabwe, accessed December 
2013; Tweedie, Neil. “A hungry future for poor voters who oppose Mugabe,” Daily Telegraph 
(London), March 26, 2005, available at 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/1486512/A-hungry-
future-for-poor-voters-who-oppose-Mugabe.html, accessed June 2012. 
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flooding was allegedly withheld from key opposition strongholds.
8
 In the Philippines, political 
connections appear to play a role in who benefits from storm relief efforts.
9
 And in Kenya, a 
number of accusations have been made about the diversion of donor funds toward politically 
connected firms and individuals
10
 as well as more blatant forms of corruption, such as bribery 
and fraudulent aid contracts.
11
  
While this article is among the first systematic studies of the impact of electoral strategies 
on aid distribution, there is a growing research agenda that documents the use of aid for political 
purposes.  In a recent review, Joseph Wright and Matthew Winters argue that regime type 
strongly mediates the effectiveness of foreign aid, in part due to concerns over aid diversion.
12
 In 
an innovative paper, Roland Hodler and Paul Raschky use satellite data to demonstrate that 
foreign aid has a stronger effect on electrification in districts that share the ethnicity of the 
incumbent.
13
 Nicolas van de Walle’s examination of donor-led structural adjustment programs in 
Africa during the 1980s and 1990s concludes that these efforts at economic policy reform were 
subject to significant political capture and frequently undermined institutional capacity.
14
  
                                                 
8
 Rashid, Ahmed, “Pakistani flood relief must start with fighting corruption,” Washington Post, 
September 6, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/05/AR2010090502816.html, accessed June 2012.  
9
 Atkinson, Hicken, and Ravanilla 2011. 
10
 Miguna 2012; Wrong 2009. 
11
 Wall Street Journal, “Kenya and the World Bank,” March 6, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120476549379315205, accessed January 2011. 
12
 Wright and Winters 2010. 
13
 Hodler and Raschky 2010. 
14
 van de Walle 2001. 
8 
 
The potential for aid to affect political change has spawned a lively debate over the effect 
of aid on democratization and regime change. A number of scholars suggest that donors can play 
a positive role in improving political institutions, either by conditioning aid on political reform or 
by building the capacity necessary for elections and stable institutions. Thad Dunning, for 
example, argues that the credibility of aid conditionality after the Cold War led to a small effect 
of aid on democratization.
15
 Other scholars suggest that the effect of aid on democracy depends 
upon the type of donor
16
 or the size of a government’s distributional coalition.17 Peter Aronow, 
Allison Carnegie, and Nikolay Marinov take advantage of plausibly exogenous variation in the 
presidency of the Council of the European Union to show that aid from the European Union 
improves human rights and governance in recipient countries.
18
  
Still others suggest that the political effects of aid are more perverse, undermining 
democracy or propping up incumbent regimes. For example, Deborah Bräutigam and Stephen 
Knack show evidence that aid dependence undermines the quality of governance in recipient 
states.
19
 Daniel Kono and Gabriella Montinola argue that aid can reward political supporters and 
show that when incumbents receive larger shares of aid they are less likely to exit power.
20
 Faisel 
Ahmed shows that aid decreases the probability of government turnover and regime collapse in 
autocracies.
21
 Amanda Licht argues that aid has an effect on leader survival, though primarily for 
                                                 
15
 Dunning 2004. 
16
 Bermeo 2011. 
17
 Wright 2009. 
18
 Aronow, Carnegie, and Marinov 2012. 
19
 Knack 2004. 
20
 Kono and Montinola 2009. 
21
 Ahmed 2012.  
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small winning coalition systems.
22
 In short, while research suggests that aid has a number of 
effects on political outcomes, the direction and mechanisms underlying these effects are far from 
clear. 
One mechanism that might explain some of the political effects of aid is that incumbents 
use aid to influence voting or distribute patronage. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, 
for example, develop a general framework to describe the use of aid as a political tool.
23
 They 
argue that incumbents use foreign aid to buy political support for their winning coalition and that 
aid is most successful in boosting political survival when incumbents have a small winning 
coalition and few resources to spend on purchasing political support.
24
 While our theories and 
empirical approaches differ, I share Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s view that aid is often 
distributed to political supporters. However, unlike their research, I focus on the role of electoral 
incentives and argue that aid also has strong political effects within democratic systems.  
A related argument is that aid creates a form of political resource curse: because foreign 
aid increases the availability of public funds, governments may be less likely to collect taxes and 
more willing to divert public funds toward political supporters. These effects may jointly reduce 
the accountability of governments to voters by breaking the link between accountability and 
revenue and increasing the cost of mobilizing against the government.
25
  
While corruption and political patronage should not always be equated, there is a related 
literature on the benefits that political elites receive from foreign aid. Peter Boone provides 
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 Licht 2010. 
23
 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007;  Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009. 
24
 This implies—in contrast to my conclusions—that the political effects of aid should primarily 
be isolated to autocratic contexts.  
25
 Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Hoffman and Gibson 2005; Morrison 2011. 
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evidence that foreign aid increases the share of income held by the elite and decreases the share 
held by the poor, implying that governments use aid for maximizing the personal wealth of the 
elite.
26
 Similarly, Jakob Svensson shows that foreign aid has a positive effect on corruption, 
particularly in states where there is a lot of competition over political resources.
27
 Ritva Reinikka 
and Svensson describe an education project in Uganda in which recipient schools received only 
13 percent of donor funds, on average.
28
 Similarly in Kenya, donors and scholars often express 
concerns about the extent of corruption and diversion in aid projects.
 29
 Using analyses of 
sectoral spending, other scholars show that in many countries a large amount of aid fails to reach 
its intended audience.
30
 
While there has been limited research on the strategic behavior of donors in response to 
political capture, there are studies that find that at the international level donors do engage in 
strategies to deter or foil the efforts of corrupt incumbents. Simone Dietrich, for example, finds 
that donors choose to deliver less aid through government institutions when those institutions are 
shown to be less effective.
31
 Winters shows that when the likelihood of corruption and capture is 
high, donors may engage in more specific targeting in order to limit the ability of central 
governments to divert funds.
32
 However, for reasons discussed below, it may be difficult for 
donors to foil the kind of micro-level diversion I document in this article.   
                                                 
26
 Boone 1996. 
27
 Svensson 2000. 
28
 Reinikka and Svensson 2004. 
29
 Wrong 2009. 
30
 Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998; Pack and Pack 1993. 
31
 Dietrich 2013. 
32
 Winters 2010. 
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These studies indicate that the politicization of aid is widespread and has potentially 
egregious effects on institutions, development, and poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, the role 
electoral incentives play in shaping these perverse outcomes is not well understood. With key 
exceptions, few of these papers seek to explore the logic behind the politicization of aid and 
fewer still address the role of reelection incentives or voters in shaping aid allocation decisions 
or test whether political supporters actually benefit from aid.  
How Elections Influence Aid Spending 
I argue that foreign aid plays a part in an exchange relationship between voters and incumbents. 
Incumbents use aid to reward key supporters and voters respond by voting for the incumbent.  In 
making this argument, I build upon a rich literature on distributional politics that offers 
considerable evidence that politicians target government investment to particular types of voters 
and districts in order to maximize either their share of votes or to punish or reward certain 
groups.
33
 
I rely on the assumption that governments play a role in the allocation of foreign aid. In 
some cases, this is undeniably true. Donors often give funds directly to government ministries in 
order to address budget gaps. In such cases, it is not surprising that this money becomes a 
political tool. However, budget support remains a minority target of donor spending and 
therefore has at best a marginal impact on political outcomes.
34
 Most spending instead occurs in 
the context of a particular development project, such as an investment in transportation 
                                                 
33
 Bates 1984; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Golden and Min 2013; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Miguel and Gugerty 2005. 
34
 In 2011, only about 3.5 percent of donor spending in Africa was direct budget support Tierney 
et al. 2011. 
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infrastructure or education, for example.  As this kind of project-specific spending is tied to 
particular outcomes, which are documented and recorded by donors, it is usually assumed to be 
less politically relevant and harder to divert.
35
  
Some studies of aid politics sidestep the problem of how governments divert aid for 
political purposes by arguing that aid is fungible, meaning that governments adjust existing 
budget allocations in response to the allocation of aid to a particular sector. While such 
reallocation does occur,
36
 evidence that this spending response is politically motivated is lacking. 
As Mark McGillivray and Oliver Morrissey point out, an adjustment in fiscal revenue or sectoral 
spending made after an increase in aid is received does not necessarily imply that such an 
outcome is perverse or politically motivated, or that the reallocation reduces overall investment 
in development.
37
 
While not denying that governments engage in politically motivated budget reallocation, 
I argue that aid spending itself is politically motivated and can have political effects regardless of 
a government’s ability to reallocate existing government budgets. In order for these political 
motivations to influence aid spending, governments have to have influence over the aid 
allocation process—and they do in most cases. In nearly all but the most unstable political 
environments, donors cooperate with government agencies in order to allocate aid. This method 
of operation is enshrined in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which committed 
over 100 signatories from multilateral agencies and governments to rely on local government 
                                                 
35
 Winters forthcoming.  
36
 Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998; Pack and Pack 1993. 
37
 McGillivray and Morrissey 2000. 
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institutions for the provision of development services when possible.
38
 The World Bank’s policy, 
for example, is to rely on government systems for financial management and oversight unless the 
government has demonstrated its inability to manage these tasks.
39
 Also, in most cases, projects 
begin with a request from a government for multilateral donors to assist in the achievement of 
some development objective.
40
 The delegation to local institutions is not surprising since 
recipient governments usually have better information than donors about how aid can best be 
utilized in their country and in many ways are better placed to make effective allocation 
decisions.  
Delegating aid allocation, however, has perverse consequences. While governments may 
care about economic development, disaster relief, or other development objectives, their first 
priority is to remain in power. As a result, governments will try to take advantage of the situation 
and use information donors are not privy to in order to ensure that electorally strategic voters 
receive higher levels of foreign aid. Donors often lack the ability—or willingness—to distinguish 
                                                 
38
 The Paris Declaration committed donors to use “a country’s own institutions and systems, 
where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes.” Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 2005. 
39
 World Bank, Financial Management in Action. 2010 Fiduciary Forum, Washington, D.C. 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETFINANCIALMGMT/Resources/K-
L/306504-1267217263705/FF2010-Feature-FM-in-Action-v5.pdf, accessed February 2011. 
40
 As one example, the Kenyan Agricultural Productivity Project began in 2009 with a request 
from the Government of Kenya for support for an agriculture productivity initiative. The World 
Bank provided over $80 million to help fund a series of pilot projects in nineteen districts. 
Despite the fact that much of the training and funding came from the World Bank, the actual 
implementation was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P082396/kenya-agricultural-productivity-
project?lang=en&tab=overview, accessed March 2011.  
14 
 
between the neediest and the most politically expedient recipients, and as a result, the latter may 
receive a larger share of aid. Moreover, by giving governments discretion over aid allocation, 
donors may inadvertently create a demand among voters that their elected representatives 
provide more aid to their districts. 
While it is difficult to generalize the process of aid delivery, anecdotal accounts support 
the claim that political incentives shape aid delivery. In some cases this influence has manifested 
in the form of direct financial or political pressure on donors. According to one report, Kenya’s 
former Prime Minister Raila Odinga verbally pressured aid donors to invest in Siaya County, his 
home area and the base of his political support.
41
 Political biases in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid 
Lands Project (ASAL) had similar origins. Though ASAL was a large multi-donor project designed 
to promote development in Kenya’s arid districts, the distribution of benefits were biased in 
favor of members of politically important ethnic groups, such as the Kamba.
42
 One way this bias 
appears to have been orchestrated was by balkanizing the distribution of aid between donors in 
order to prevent any single donor from undermining the distributional intentions of the 
government.
43
 Civil servants and politicians also reportedly withheld ASAL funding and support 
                                                 
41
 To quote a senior advisor to the prime minister: “More than once I sat in meetings where 
investors would propose to fund the development of various initiatives, including such things as 
garbage incineration. The French government made proposals of improving the infrastructure of 
Kisumu. But each time, Raila would crassly steer the discussions to Siaya County, specifically 
Bondo Town where he hailed from.” Miguna 2012, 176–77. 
42
 This bias was apparently orchestrated intentionally. Among other things, the first, second, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth projects under this program were located in the Permanent Secretary’s 
home district, suggesting considerable political influence over the allocation. Cohen 1995. 
43
 Cohen 1995. 
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from districts without political connections, making it more difficult for donors to allay these 
biases.
44
 
The Distributional Politics of Aid 
How do electoral politics influence aid distribution? I start with the assumptions that an 
incumbent is trying to maximize her share of votes and that voters are trying to maximize their 
economic gain and put their preferred candidate in power.
 
Given these, as well as the assumption 
that incumbents have sufficient discretion to allocate aid, predictions about how governments 
will distribute aid if they are trying to maximize vote share can be derived.  
Building upon similar assumptions, Avinash Dixit and John Londregan model the 
strategic behavior of incumbents as an attempt to allocate government revenue to voters who are 
most likely to respond to a marginal increase in welfare by voting in the incumbent’s favor.45  
Depending upon the assumptions one makes about the transactional costs associated with such 
an exchange, Dixit and Londregan’s model either leads to a “swing voter” strategy in which 
incumbents target voters who are indifferent about the candidates or a “core voter” strategy in 
which incumbents target their supporters.  
Similar incentives for increasing vote share shape the distribution of aid spending in 
Kenya, but partisan links among voters there are weak. Kenyan voters tend to vote in ethnic 
blocks, making it difficult for candidates to use a swing voter strategy in the same way as 
candidates do in many developed states.
46
  Kenyan incumbents win elections by building a 
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 Wiggins 1985. 
45
 Dixit and Londregan 1996. 
46
 As Horowitz  2009 points out, Kenyan incumbents do sometimes campaign for the 
endorsement of swing ethnic groups. 
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coalition of ethnic groups through strategic promises of government spending and ministerial 
assignments. Since no single ethnic group makes up a majority of the population, incumbents are 
forced to compete for the support of a coalition of ethnic groups. 
The ethnic nature of Kenyan politics tends to reward governments that distribute public 
spending and ministerial jobs within ethnic coalitions.  Robin Burgess, Jedwad Remi, Edward 
Miguel, and Ameet Morjaria refer to the logic of ethnic targeting in Kenya as an “our turn to eat 
game.”47 Because previous leaders targeted certain ethnic groups with public spending, voters 
use ethnicity as a signal for how an incumbent is likely to distribute government largess in the 
future. These expectations make it difficult for incumbents to commit to distributing goods along 
nonethnic lines. Consistent with this logic, constituencies frequently vote over 90 percent in 
favor of coethnic candidates (candidates sharing the same ethnicity as the voter) and have higher 
turnout rates whenever a coethnic is contesting the office of president.
48
 Moreover, public 
spending in Kenya disproportionately favors coethnic voters. Burgess and his coauthors studied 
the distribution of paved road investment over time in Kenya (from 1961–2002) and show that 
such investment consistently favored coethnics and residents in the home districts of government 
officials.
49
 Similar forms of targeting are found in other studies of Kenyan public spending and 
across a number of other multiethnic states.
50
 
Incumbents in many developing states, including Kenya, have an advantage in targeting 
coethnic and copartisan voters due to their investment in clientelistic networks among these 
groups. Rather than direct public goods toward a large number of political supporters, 
                                                 
47
 Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, and Morjaria 2010. 
48
 Author’s calculations.  
49
 Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, and Morjaria 2010. 
50
 Alwy and Schech 2004; Franck and Rainer 2012; Posner and Kramon 2013; Posner 2005. 
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clientelistic exchanges provide selective benefits to particular individuals in exchange for 
political support. These targeted exchanges are a way in which incumbents resolve the credibility 
problem associated with exchanging services for votes. By providing jobs to individual would-be 
supporters
51
 or by relying on patrons to deliver votes,
52
 incumbents are better able to monitor 
voting and to commit to delivering on their electoral promises.  Since such clientelistic networks 
are costly to develop in areas not populated by one’s core supporters, patronage spending tends 
to fall along ethnic lines.  
In Kenya, foreign aid appears often to be a tool to provide such clientelistic benefits to 
political supporters. In an 2007 audit of the World Bank HIV/AIDS Disaster Response Project, 
auditors noted that members of parliament (MPs) were personally involved in the disbursement of 
funds and that project committees were frequently packed with loyal supporters, which allowed 
politically connected grant applicants to obtain significant advantages by virtue of their 
connection to MPs.
53
 Similar attempts by politicians to use aid for political purposes in Kenya 
have been documented elsewhere. Michela Wrong, for example, notes a number of cases in 
which incumbent politicians benefitted from corruption in aid spending during the Emilio Mwai 
Kibaki (2002–2007) and power-sharing (2007–2013) regimes.54 
There are some potential objections to my argument. One might wonder why donors 
would allow aid to be captured in the way described here. After all, donors do care about 
                                                 
51
 Robinson and Verdier 2002. 
52
 Keefer and Vlaicu 2008. 
53
 This information comes from a 2007 World Bank Department of Institutional Integrity report 
investigated by the Wall Street Journal. See Wall Street Journal, “Kenya and the World Bank,” 
March 6, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120476549379315205, 
accessed January 2011. 
54
 Wrong 2009; Miguna 2012. 
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mismanagement and, at least at the international level, choose how and where to target aid to 
prevent politically orchestrated corruption.
55
 In Kenya, for example, many donors, including the 
World Bank, have reduced or eliminated budget support from their aid portfolios in response to 
mismanagement.
56
 Yet, despite measures to reduce capture, many aid workers freely admit the 
role that political incentives play in the allocation of aid dollars.
57
 In reality, while 
mismanagement can be mediated, it is impossible to separate politics from the process of aid 
spending. As discussed above, donors have neither the information nor the capacity to effectively 
monitor all aspects of the aid delivery process. In addition, it is not clear that they always have 
the incentive to do so. To reiterate, there are a number of good reasons donors delegate to 
recipients control over parts of the aid allocation process but doing so reduces their ability to 
manage allocation biases. The delegation is due, in part, to the informational advantage held by 
recipient governments, as well to the fact that delegation may promote institutional capacity and 
lead to more sustainable development outcomes. 
 Moreover, donor and government incentives are not always misaligned. Government 
support is critical to the success of most donor-led projects, and aid project records are rife with 
cases in which donors were forced to compromise the terms of a project in order to ensure its 
approval.
58
 In addition, aid is often tied to political concerns, so donors may choose to overlook 
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 Dietrich 2013; Winters 2010.  
56
 Hornsby 2012. 
57
 Author interviews in Kenya, June 2012. See also Klitgaard 1991 and Berkman 2008. 
58
 Klitgaard 1991, for example, includes an illustrative story of attempts by donors to include 
banking reform as part of a structural reform package in Equitorial Guinea. Since state banks 
were used distribute patronage, donors were ultimately forced to drop this provision to ensure the 
continuity of the project. For similar accounts see Cohen 1995, Wiggins 1985, and Wrong  2009. 
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the use of aid to sway policy.
59
 Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus and others go as far as to argue 
that donors often give aid with the goal of helping incumbents win elections in politically aligned 
regimes, suggesting that donors might sometimes intend to promote the form of capture 
described here.
60
 
Hypotheses 
The argument above suggests that incumbent parties should be successful at influencing aid 
delivery in favor of groups that are likely to respond to an increase in aid spending by turning out 
and voting for the ruling party.  My model predicts that strong supporters of opposition parties 
will rarely benefit from the distribution of aid.  Such groups—were it even possible to change 
their votes—would require a significant investment by candidates. As a result, in all but the most 
implausible cases, candidates will find it cheaper to purchase the vote of less ideologically 
opposed groups.  
—H1. Core supporters of the opposition party are less likely to receive foreign aid than 
core supporters of the incumbent party.  
Depending upon the assumptions one makes about the credibility of electoral promises 
and the ability of incumbents to mobilize swing voters, candidates will specifically target either 
swing or core voters. As discussed above, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to 
believe that in Kenya electoral commitments to core voters (and particularly to coethnics) are 
more credible and valuable than such commitments to swing voters and, therefore, that these 
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 Kuziemko and Werker 2006. 
60
 Brown 2001; Faye and Niehaus 2012. 
20 
 
voters will receive a larger share of goods. This conclusion can also be formally tested and I 
include models of both swing voter and core voter allocation rules. 
—H2. Strong supporters of the incumbent party (core voters) receive more foreign aid 
than voters who have less support for the incumbent party (opposition and swing voters).  
—H3. Voters who share the ethnicity of the incumbent candidate (coethnic voters) 
receive more foreign aid than those who do not.  
—H4. Weak supporters of the incumbent party (swing voters) receive more foreign aid 
than voters who do not support the incumbent party (opposition voters) or voters with 
strong support for the incumbent party (core voters). 
If governments use aid to influence election outcomes, these efforts should meet with 
some success. I also test the claim that aid changes the voting behavior of aid recipients.  
—H5. Those who benefit more from foreign aid will be more likely to vote for the 
incumbent party.  
A discussion of the data and research design for testing these hypotheses follows.  
Election and Ethnicity Data 
Kenya holds elections every five years in December for the president and 210 constituency-level 
national assembly ministers. The president is elected by a plurality rule with the contingency that 
he must obtain 25 percent of the vote in five of Kenya’s seven provinces. Ministers are similarly 
elected by a plurality rule in single-member districts.  While a number of parties contest each of 
these elections, in practice almost all votes go to the two leading parties in each election.  
I collected data on national assembly elections for each of the 210 constituencies from 
1992 to 2007. Since data on presidential elections at a constituency level is difficult to obtain 
prior to 2007, I estimate models using support for the incumbent party in the national assembly 
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elections. Support for the incumbent party is highly correlated between presidential and national 
assembly elections, making the decision to use presidential or assembly results largely 
inconsequential.
61
  
Detailed data on ethnicity are impossible to obtain at a constituency level for all of 
Kenya. Following other studies,
62
 I estimate the majority ethnic group in each constituency using 
survey data from the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health Surveys.
63
 These surveys provide 
a sample of 16,639 individuals randomly sampled from each district in Kenya. While using these 
data may introduce a small amount of error,
64
 my estimates of the majority ethnic group match 
up very closely to other estimates, including those conducted at a district level during the 1989 
census.
65
  
Aid Project Data 
To test the hypotheses, I look at the geographic distribution of foreign aid projects in Kenya 
during three of the country’s regimes from 1992 to 2010. The data contain the geographic 
                                                 
61
 The victory margin at a constituency level for the president and the president’s party’s MP is 
correlated at 89 percent for the 2007 election.  While I only have limited constituency-level data 
for presidential elections, I test these hypotheses using both sets of data when possible.  
62
 Horowitz 2009. 
63
 These data are available at http://www.measuredhs.com/What-We-Do/Survey-
Types/DHS.cfm, accessed March 1, 2011.  
64
 This introduces sampling error and cannot account for variation in ethnicity over time. Since 
my interest is in whether a regime is majority coethnic or not, small errors in the percentage 
estimates should result in little or no bias in the coding of the final variable. Also most 
constituencies have limited ethnic heterogeneity.  
65
 A comparison of my data and the 1989 Census is in the supplementary appendix Table A8, see 
Jablonski 2014.  
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location of the benefits from all African Development Bank or World Bank projects during these 
regimes, along with the project allocation amounts and approval dates. A team of researchers and 
I read the World Bank and African Development Bank project completion or information 
reports
66
 and coded each project with a geographic coordinate (or set of coordinates) 
representing its location (or locations) as well its geographic scope, following an existing scheme 
used by other scholars and a number of donors.
67
 Additionally, for projects that were complete as 
of 2011, I rely on existing data collected by Michael Findley, Josh Powell, Daniel Strandow, and 
Jeff Tanner.
68
  Using these data, I calculate the total value of allocated aid going to each of 
Kenya’s constituencies.69 This provides a data set of 3,780 constituency years (210 
constituencies * 18 years), representing over $7 billion in committed aid.
70
  
                                                 
66
 World Bank Project Database, available at http://www.worldbank.org/projects, accessed 
March 1, 2011; African Development Bank Projects and Operations, available at 
http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations, accessed March 1, 2011. 
67
 Findley, Powell, Strandow, and Tanner 2011. In some cases, the location of a project crosses 
administrative boundaries. In order to code these data at a constituency level, I assume that aid is 
distributed to each constituency by that constituency’s share of the population. The results are 
largely insensitive to this assumption and similar results are obtained assuming distribution by 
land area or administrative units. See Jablonski 2014, Section 2 and Table A3 of the 
supplementary appendix for details. 
68
 Findley, Powell, Strandow, and Tanner 2011coded all active projects in Kenya. Historical 
projects are coded by the author.  
69
 For these models, I use the total value of each project. In some cases, the total value may 
include money from other donors and investors.  
70
 Details on the coding and sources of these data are available in the supplementary appendix, 
see Jablonski 2014.  
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In some cases aid is not located in a specific region but is instead distributed directly to a 
government ministry or intended to be distributed equally across an entire country.
71
 To reduce 
noise in the data, I exclude these cases from the data set. However, the results are largely 
insensitive to including these data. A full discussion of the coding rules is available in the 
supplementary appendix.
72
 
These data seem reasonably representative of the larger multilateral development effort in 
Kenya. In addition to the African Development Bank and the World Bank being two of the 
largest multilateral donors in Kenya (Figure 1), their projects are widely distributed across 
sectors and geographic regions (Figure 2).  
  
                                                 
71
 About 20 percent of projects fit these criteria.  
72
 Jablonski 2014. 
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Figure 1: Kenyan Aid Commitments by Donor, 1980-2010
a 
a
Each line shows that log of aid commitments by a donor in each year (in 2000 USD). 
Data are from Tierney et al.
73
 
  
                                                 
73
 Tierney et al. 2011. 
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I make some assumptions when determining the value of each project and the date of 
allocation. As illustrated above, much of a government’s influence over aid allocation is exerted 
while donors and government officials plan and negotiate the disbursal of foreign aid. Donors 
and governments decide on the amount and the location of aid disbursements during the planning 
stage of a project. It should therefore be expected that political influence is most consequential 
during this stage. For this reason I use the project approval date to determine which regime 
controlled allocation of the aid and I use the total committed value of the project as opposed to 
the disbursal amount. I also relax these assumptions and demonstrate that the results are robust to 
using disbursal amounts.  
Since I am interested in the effect of electoral politics and Kenya has only held multiparty 
elections since 1992, I look at the allocation of aid after this date.
74
 From 1992–2002  I assume 
that the allocation of aid was influenced by the regime of Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) party.
75
 In 2002, Moi stepped down and Kibaki and the National 
Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) came to power in a contested election. Thus from 2002 
until the election in 2007, I assume that the Kibaki regime influenced the allocation of aid.  
                                                 
74
 While Kenya held elections prior to 1992, they were widely considered to be a referendum on 
the ruling regime rather than a competitive election. Throup and Hornsby 1998. 
75
 One might object to this coding on the grounds that Daniel arap Moi was term limited 
after 1997 and so had few incentives to bias aid in the KANU’s favor. However, despite being 
term limited, Moi appears to have been invested in the KANU victory. This is due in part to Moi’s 
intention to retain control over the KANU government behind the scenes. In addition to appointing 
Uhuru Kenyatta as his chosen successor, Moi appointed himself the chairman of the new KANU 
party with veto power over policy decisions and cabinet appointments. As an additional 
incentive, Moi faced the very real (though largely unrealized) threat that he and his family would 
be prosecuted if the KANU were to lose the election. Steeves 2006; Branch 2011. 
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Coding the decision rules from the December 2007 election to the end of my study period 
in 2010 is less straightforward. The 2007 election in Kenya was highly contested and resulted in 
widespread violence. In the aftermath, the United Nations brokered a power-sharing arrangement 
between the two front-runners, Kibaki (now Party National Unity [PNU]) and Raila Odinga 
(Orange Democratic Movement Party [ODM]). The provisions of this agreement included joint 
heads of state, unanimity rules, and a shared cabinet.
76
 This joint arrangement makes it difficult 
to determine a clear decision rule. However, as I discuss below, there are empirical and 
substantive reasons to believe that the ODM had a stronger incentive than the PNU to influence aid 
distribution decisions, and thus the ODM party is coded as the incumbent.
77
 I relax this 
assumption to explore in more detail the decision rules from the end of 2007 to 2010.  
Figure 2 plots the geographic distribution of these projects by the constituency-level 
victory margin during these regimes (see Figure A1 in the supplementary appendix for a similar 
map of ethnic data
78
). Note that there is significant variation in the geographic distribution of 
foreign aid over time as well as in the level of support for the incumbent regime by geographic 
region. It is partly because of the extensive variation in the independent and dependent variables 
that makes Kenya an excellent case for testing the political determinants of aid distribution.  
Note also that these plots—while they should only be considered suggestive—lend some 
credence to the hypotheses enumerated above. During the Moi regime, there is a noticeable 
tendency for aid to have been targeted to the northern and eastern portions of the country, which 
strongly supported him. Moreover, if Nairobi is excluded, very little aid targeted the opposition 
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 Horowitz 2009. 
77
 Among other things, most ministries involved in aid delivery are held by the ODM. 
78
  Jablonski 2014. 
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stronghold in central Kenya.
79
 In contrast, during the Kibaki regime from 2002 to 2007, aid 
shifted away from the northern and eastern regions toward central Kenya and the Western and 
Nyanza provinces that supported Kibaki.  This tendency for the distribution of aid to reflect 
regime politics is even more apparent in figures 3 and 4, where these relationships are plotted 
more directly.  
Figure 2: Map of Foreign Aid Projects by Victory Margin
a 
a
Each dot indicates the location of a World Bank or African Development Bank project as coded by 
author.  
 
  
                                                 
79
 The predominant ethnic group of this region is Kikuyu, which is the ethnicity of Mwai Kibaki, 
who was the opposition leader in 1997 and the victor in 2002.  
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Figure 3 shows the relationship between aid distribution and incumbent victory margin at 
the constituency level during the Moi (1992–2002) and the Kibaki (2002–2007) regimes.80 Even 
in these unadjusted data, there appears to be a positive correlation between aid and victory 
margin in both eras.  
Figure 4 plots the distribution of aid by the ODM and PNU parties during the power-
sharing regime that came to power in December 2007. In what is perhaps the exception that 
proves the rule, there is a more ambiguous relationship between incumbent support and the 
distribution of foreign aid during this period. There is a noticeable positive relationship for the 
ODM party but, as I explain below, this appears to be due to the greater influence that it holds 
over the ministries involved in aid distribution as a result of the power-sharing compromise. 
These figures only indicate so much, however. It is possible that these correlations are 
just that. Political support, for example, may be correlated with poverty levels and economic 
need and the variables could confound this relationship. In order to determine whether the 
distributional pattern is politically motivated, the next section turns to a formal empirical 
assessment.  
 
                                                 
80
 Incumbent victory margin is equal to the vote percentage of the incumbent party in the 
previous election minus the vote percentage of the leading opposition party.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Foreign Aid Projects by Victory Margin
a 
a
Each dot or cross indicates a project or the portion of a project in a constituency. Vertical lines 
show the 95% confidence interval for the least squares line.  Electoral data come from the 1992 
and 1997 National Assembly election in the left panel and the 2002 National Assembly election 
in the right panel. Incumbent Victory Margin is the percentage of votes for the governing party 
minus the percentage of votes for the leading opposition party. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Foreign Aid Projects by PNU and ODM Votes
a 
a
Each dot or cross indicates a project or the portion of a project in a constituency. Vertical lines 
show the 95% confidence interval for the least squares line.  Electoral data come from the 2007 
National Assembly election. Incumbent Victory Margin is the percentage of votes for the PNU 
party minus the percentage of votes for the ODM party in the left panel, and ODM minus PNU 
votes in the right panel. 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
To estimate the impact of victory margin and coethnicity, I begin by estimating a constituency-
level fixed-effects model with time trends and regime fixed effects. I next estimate difference-in-
differences models for each regime in order to more completely assess the causal impact of these 
variables, as well as to show how regimes adjust their allocation in response to a changing 
political map. I then turn to a series of robustness checks that relax some of the assumptions. 
Finally, I provide evidence that aid has also altered victory margins in Kenyan elections.  
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The fixed-effects estimation problems are represented below:    
 
                 ⁄                                              (1) 
and 
                 ⁄                                                     (2) 
 
                 ⁄     is the log of aid per capita in constituency i and year t. It is a function 
of Victory Marginit, which measures the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent party in 
the last general election minus the percentage of votes obtained by the leading opposition party 
in constituency i.
81
 Coethnic Constituencyit equals 1 if the majority ethnic group in constituency i 
is the same ethnic group as the incumbent and 0 otherwise.
82
 Also included are constituency-
level fixed effects   , regime fixed effects   , and a linear time trend   . In each case, the 
coefficient   is the effect of interest, which is equal to the average effect of Coethnic 
Constituency or Victory Margin on aid per capita for Kenya’s three regimes after differencing 
out the average amount of aid given in each constituency and regime. In each case, I predict the 
coefficient should be positive. I estimate these equations using a linear model and cluster the 
standard errors by constituency to account for any residual autocorrelation in the errors.
83
   
                                                 
81
 Election data were compiled from a number of sources:  Kollman, Hicken, Caramani, and 
Backer 2010; Throup and Hornsby 1998; Weis 2008. 
82
 Official census data on ethnicity at the constituency-level for Kenya are not available. I take 
advantage of geographically coded data collected by the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health 
Survey in order to estimate the majority ethnic group in each constituency. These data are 
available at http://www.measuredhs.com/What-We-Do/Survey-Types/DHS.cfm, accessed March 
1, 2011.  
83
 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004. 
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While many confounding variables are addressed by the fixed intercepts and trends, I also 
include a vector of controls,  Xit, to account for variables that could be expected to confound the 
relationship between electoral outcomes and aid distribution. In particular, I control for 
nonpolitical factors that might predict the distribution of aid for incumbents or donors. Since 
donors may care about economic need or poverty, I control for the log of Infant Mortality per 
Capita
84
 in a constituency as well as Percent Poverty, which is the percentage of individuals 
below the national poverty level in a constituency.
85
 In addition, since donors may adjust their 
portfolios in response to other donors, in some specifications I control for the log of Bilateral Aid 
per Capita, which is the amount of aid given by bilateral donors on a national level in each year, 
as well as the log of Other Multilateral Aid per Capita, which is the amount of aid given by 
multilateral donors other than the World Bank and the African Development Bank on a national 
level in each year.
86
 I also include GDP (gross domestic product) (log) on a national level for 
each year to account for any national income effects.
87
 
I argue that incumbents are primarily interested in maximizing the amount of aid 
distributed to politically strategic voters. One difficulty in estimating such an effect is that 
                                                 
84
 Infant mortality per capita is calculated by taking the log of the average number of infant 
deaths per person in a constituency using the 2003 and 2008 Demographic and Health Survey. 
These data are available at http://www.measuredhs.com/What-We-Do/Survey-Types/DHS.cfm, 
accessed March 1, 2011.  Due to the limited number of survey results, these data do not vary 
over time.  
85
 Constituency-level poverty data is available for 2006 and 1999. Missing years are assumed to 
follow a constant constituency-level growth rate equal to the average yearly change in poverty 
for each constituency. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, available at 
http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/keninfo, accessed September 10, 2011.  
86
 Tierney et al. 2011. 
87
 World Bank 2011. 
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incumbents may have other discretionary funds to spend on constituents. To avoid any 
estimation biases such funds could engender, I control for non-aid sources of income, including 
Tax Revenue (log) and GDP (log) on a national level for each year.
88
 In addition, in the 
robustness checks, I control for the log of a constituency’s budget in each year.89  
I also control for constituency Land Area (log square km)
90
 and the logged Population
91
 
of each constituency, since they might predict higher levels of aid. Finally, I control for Ethno 
Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF)
92
 since it has been shown in previous studies to be a negative 
predictor of public goods in Kenya.
93
 The summary statistics for each of these variables are 
found in Table1. Because many of these control variables cannot be estimated within this fixed-
effect specification, I estimate the models both with and without regime and constituency-level 
fixed effects. 
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 World Bank 2011. 
89
 I have limited data on constituency-level spending, and so I only report the results using these 
controls in the robustness results. These data come from the Ministry of Local Government and 
Community Development Fund Board (CDF). Available at http://opendata.go.ke/d/2dr6-gdne, 
accessed September 10, 2011.  
90
 World Resources Institute. Available at http://www.wri.org/publication/content/9291, accessed 
July 1, 2011.  
91
 Constituency-level population data is available for 2006 and 1999. Missing years are assumed 
to follow a constant constituency-level growth rate equal to the average yearly change in 
population for each constituency. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Available at 
http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/keninfo, accessed September 10, 2011.  
92
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) is a Herfindahl index that measures the diversity of 
ethnic groups in a constituency. This is calculated as ELF    ∑         where s is the share of 
the population in a constituency held by each ethnic group i.  
93
 Miguel and Gugerty 2005. 
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Table 1: Summary Data 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Mean 
Moi 
Regime 
Mean 
Kibaki 
Regime 
Mean 
Sharing 
Regime 
Aid per Capita (log) 0.86 1.26 0.00 7.24 0.65 1.29 0.94 
Disbursed Aid per Capita (log) 0.37 0.84 0.00 5.60 0.38 0.56 0.00 
African Dev. Bank Aid per 
Capita (log) 0.18 0.54 0.00 5.28 0.19 0.16 0.20 
World Bank Aid per Capita 
(log) 0.75 1.24 0.00 7.04 0.54 1.20 0.74 
Victory Margin 0.22 0.46 -1.00 1.00 0.27 0.16 0.14 
Incumbent Vote Share 0.43 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.47 0.32 
Opposition Vote Share 0.21 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.31 0.18 
Co-Ethnic Constituency 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.21 0.10 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization (ELF) 0.25 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Infant Mortality per Capita 
(log) 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.80 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Population (log) 11.83 0.51 9.72 13.7 11.74 11.93 11.98 
Government Spending per 
Capita (log) 3.08 0.79 0.76 5.96 NA 3.02 3.38 
Percent Poverty 0.55 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.50 0.65 
Land Area (log square km.) 6.75 1.53 2.08 10.6 6.75 6.75 6.75 
National Tax Revenue (log) 21.61 0.40 20.7 22.3 21.35 21.79 22.25 
National Bilateral Aid per 
Capita (log) 2.83 0.81 0.00 3.84 2.69 3.35 2.48 
National Multilateral Aid per 
Capita (log) 2.63 0.69 1.16 3.77 2.36 3.09 2.85 
National GDP (log) 23.36 0.35 22.6 23.9 23.14 23.54 23.88 
 
All monetary variables are in year 2000 dollars unless otherwise specified.  
 
Empirical Results 
I first estimate the model using the full set of fixed intercepts and trends (Table 2), which allows 
me to estimate the average effect of political variables on aid allocation across all regimes. The 
results lend strong support to hypotheses 1 and 2—constituencies with a larger share of votes for 
the incumbent party receive a significantly larger share of aid and constituencies that strongly 
support the opposing party receive significantly less aid. In substantive terms (Figure 5), support 
35 
 
for the incumbent party increases a constituency’s share of aid on average by more than a dollar 
per capita each year. Given that the each Kenyan receives US$1.38 in aid on average from the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank each year, it represents a sizeable increase. This 
result appears to be an election effect, rather than just an artifact of coethnic targeting. 
Interestingly, even after controlling for Coethnic Constituency, the coefficient on Victory Margin 
is large and significant.
94
 
I also test for nonlinearity in this effect (Table 2). If a swing voter hypothesis (Hypothesis 
4) helps explain the results, a decreasing share of aid to the constituencies that most strongly 
supported the incumbent party should be seen. I reject this hypothesis by testing whether a 
polynomial term for Victory Margin has a negative coefficient and increases the fit of the model 
(model 2). Instead, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on the polynomial term is 
positive and significant, implying that aid distribution is even higher among the most supportive 
constituencies.
95
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 Since Coethnic Constituency is a blunt measure, this is not entirely conclusive of an electoral 
effect. In supplementary appendix Table A7, I recalculate these models using an estimate of the 
total number of coethnic constituents. I also exclude coethnic constituencies. The electoral effect 
remains consistent. Jablonski 2014. 
95
 In supplementary appendix Table A6, I estimate a swing-voter effect using the absolute level 
of Victory Margin. The results remain consistent. Jablonski 2014. 
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Table 2: The Effect of Incumbent Support and Ethnicity on Aid Allocation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Victory Margin 0.26** 0.19** 
   
0.19** 
  0.04 0.05 
   
0.05 
Victory Margin
2
 
 
0.26** 
      
 
0.09 
    Incumbent Percentage 
  
0.49** 
     
  
0.07 
   Opposition Percentage 
   
-0.25** 
    
   
0.09 
  Co-Ethnic Constituency 
    
0.32** 0.21** 
  
    
0.06 0.07 
Observations 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,753 3,762 3,753 
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 
+
p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Constituency clustered standard errors in parentheses. Estimated 
using a linear model with constituency-level fixed-effects, regime fixed-effects, and a time trend. 
Included, but not shown, are controls for Percent Poverty, Population (log), and National Tax 
Revenue. Other time and regime invariant controls are removed due to co-linearity with the fixed 
effects. 
 
Figure 5: Aid Allocation by Co-Ethnicity and Victory Margin
 
Estimates are simulated from the fixed-effects estimates shown in Model 1 and 4 in Table 2. 
Estimated dollar amounts are in 2000 USD.  The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval 
for these predictions.   
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I also show estimates of the effect of ethnicity on aid distribution. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, coethnic constituencies receive a significantly larger share of aid. In substantive 
terms, moving from a non-coethnic constituency to a coethnic constituency increases the average 
aid per capita in a year by approximately 80 cents (Figure 5).  
In the supplementary appendix, I reestimate these models using a random intercept for 
each constituency in order to show the effect of time-invariant control variables.  While there 
appears to be a bias toward richer constituencies, higher levels of infant mortality associated with 
greater aid distribution are also observed, which is consistent with the idea that recipient needs 
also matter (see Table A1 in the supplementary appendix
96
). 
While these results imply a political bias in the allocation of aid, there are weaknesses in 
this approach. By estimating the average effect of Victory Margin and Coethnic Constituency, I 
cannot rule out the possibility that there are regime-specific interactions driving this effect or test 
whether regimes differ in the extent to which they distribute aid to their supporters. Some 
scholars argue, for example, that there was more corruption in aid distribution during the Moi 
regime than after it, so there may be a concern that the political bias holds only during this 
period. In order to address this concern, I estimate a difference-in-differences effect for each 
regime separately, allowing me to test whether each regime biases aid spending in a consistent 
manner. If my hypotheses are correct, a consistent effect should be observed for each regime’s 
victory margin and ethnicity when it is in power and little or no effect should be observed after it 
exits.  
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 Jablonski 2014. 
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Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
A difference-in-differences strategy is an attempt to isolate the average effect of the treatment 
variable by subtracting the effect of the treatment variable on years and groups where a treatment 
effect would be expected from years and groups where such an effect would not be expected. I 
chose this strategy in order to rule out potential confounds and demonstrate the temporal 
variation of cause and effect by subtracting the effect of ethnicity and voter support during a 
regime from their effect when the regime is not in power.
97
  
To see why this strategy might help assess causation, consider the problem of trying to 
estimate the effect of Kalenjin coethnicity during the Moi regime. One way to attempt such an 
estimate is to compare aid in Kalenjin constituencies during the Moi regime to aid in non-
Kalenjin constituencies during the same regime: 
    (   |                      )   (   |                      )  (3) 
 
where Kalenjin = 1 if a constituency is populated by the Kalenjin ethnic group and 0 otherwise, 
and MoiRegime = 1 if the year is between 1992 and 2002 and 0 otherwise.    is therefore equal 
to the difference in aid distribution between coethnic and non-coethnic constituencies during the 
Moi regime. Such a cross-sectional approach suffers from serious drawbacks, though, since the 
Kalenjin are located in areas with comparatively high levels of wealth and education—factors 
that can also predict aid distribution. It would be difficult to interpret results from such an 
approach. 
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 Angrist and Krueger 1999; Meyer 1994. 
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A difference-in-differences approach takes advantage of the fact that Kalenjin ethnicity 
should only affect aid distribution during the Moi regime. As a result, any time-invariant effect 
of Kalenjin constituencies can be removed by subtracting the average level of aid given to 
Kalenjin areas during periods when Moi is not in power.  
    (   |                      )   (   |                      )  (4)     
 
The    in this equation should pick up most time invariant demographic and economic factors 
that distinguish the Kalenjin-populated areas from other areas of Kenya. As a result, by 
subtracting    from     an estimate of the effect of Kalenjin ethnicity on aid allocation that is 
independent of most confounding factors can be obtained: 
                                                                                                             (5) 
Under assumptions of group equivalence, constant treatment effects, and independent errors, this 
difference-in-differences estimate,   , is equivalent to the average treatment effect of Kalenjin 
ethnicity on aid allocation.
98
 
Since time-variant factors specific to the Moi regime could still confound these estimates, 
I estimate this model using a regression framework, which allows me to include additional 
control variables. Formally, for each regime, let         be 1 if a particular regime is in power 
in year t and 0 otherwise. Let                be 1 if a constituency i shares ethnicity with the 
regime’s incumbent and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let                       be the victory 
margin for the regime’s incumbent in each constituency i. The difference-in-differences 
problems are represented as follows: 
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                 ⁄                                                    
                                                                                                                                   (6) 
and 
                 ⁄     
                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                (7) 
 
The coefficient    provides the effect of               when a regime is in power, subtracting 
the effect of               when the regime is not in power. As a result,     provides a 
reasonable estimate of the extent to which each regime changes Kenya’s aid portfolio among its 
constituents. Due to the problems of group-level serial correlation associated with difference-in-
differences estimates,
99
 I cluster the standard errors and include constituency-level random 
effects   , regime fixed effects   , and time trends   .100 In each of these models I control for the 
same set of time-varying covariates included in previous models, though for brevity these 
coefficients are omitted from the results presented below.  
I first estimate these models for the Moi regime (1992–2002). Since Moi was from the 
Kalenjin ethnic group and the KANU party, I look for the effect of the KANU party’s victory 
margin and Kalenjin ethnicity on aid allocation during this regime after differencing out the 
effect of KANU victory margin and Kalenjin ethnicity when Moi was not in power. The results in 
Figure 6 lend strong support to the claim that incumbents adjust their aid portfolio in response to 
changing political pressures. During the Moi regime, Kalenjin constituencies received 
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 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004. 
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 Results are also consistent using constituency fixed effects. 
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approximately 36 cents more aid per year on a per capita basis than other constituencies. 
However, after Moi left power in 2002, Kalenjin constituencies received, on average, 29 cents 
per capita less aid than the average constituency.  
 
Figure 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Moi and Kibaki Regimes
 
 
Horizontal bars show the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient estimate. Estimated using a 
difference-in-differences model with constituency-level random-effects, regime fixed-effects, and 
time trends. Included, but not shown, are controls for Percent Poverty, Infant Mortality per Capita, 
GDP (log), Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, Land Area, Population (log), and National Tax 
Revenue. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. 
 
The evidence for regime-specific aid biases is even stronger during the Mwai Kibaki 
regime. These results (Figure 6) suggest that from 2003 to 2007, when Kibaki was in power, 
coethnic Kikuyu constituencies and the constituencies with a high margin of victory for the NARC 
party received a significantly larger share of foreign aid. Again, this does not appear to be driven 
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by any specific need of these constituencies; when Kibaki was not in power, they received less 
aid on average.  
Finally, I also estimate these models during the power-sharing regime between the ODM 
party, controlled by Raila Odinga, and the PNU party, controlled by Kibaki. Rather than make 
assumptions about which party is more likely to control distribution during this period, I include 
estimates for parties and ethnicities. A bias in aid distribution in favor of ODM supporters is seen 
in Figure 7, but the results are weaker than those found during other regimes, which is consistent 
with the fact that neither Odinga nor Kibaki had complete control over the government. 
Nevertheless, this bias in favor of the ODM is consistent with the fact that most of the ministries 
involved in the aid delivery process, including the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Roads, the 
Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Local Government, were given to the ODM 
party.
101
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Figure 7:  Difference-in-Differences Estimates, Power Sharing Regime, 2008-2010
 
 
Horizontal bars show the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient estimate. Estimated using a difference-
in-differences model with constituency-level random-effects, regime fixed-effects, and time trends. Included, 
but not shown, are controls for Percent Poverty, Infant Mortality per Capita, GDP (log), Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization, Land Area, Population (log), and National Tax Revenue. Standard errors are clustered by 
constituency. 
 
Robustness Checks 
These results offer compelling evidence for the covariation of political support and aid spending, 
but there are still questions one might raise about them. One possible objection is that I have not 
adequately accounted for non-aid spending. If donors respond strategically to government 
spending in each constituency, there might be concerns that the observed effect is an artifact of 
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donors’ spending decisions.102 To test this possibility, I collect data on constituency-level 
budgets in Kenya and create a variable, Constituency Budget, which equals the log of the per 
capita budget in year 2000 US dollars.
103
 I then reestimate the fixed-effects models using this 
variable as a control (Table 3). Unfortunately, data for this variable are only available from 2003 
to 2008, so I can only estimate this model for one regime. Nevertheless, even with the smaller 
sample, the results are largely consistent. Coethnic Constituency remains a strong and significant 
predictor of aid allocation while the coefficient on Victory Margin is no longer significant. It 
appears that the latter result is due to the sample size rather than to any confounding effect of 
government spending.
104
 
Table 3 also includes estimates that use aid disbursal amounts rather than aid allocation 
amounts. These data are only available for the World Bank and should be interpreted with care 
as many of the projects remain open and are disbursed across multiple regimes. However, 
Coethnic Constituency and Victory Margin remain positive and significant.  
  
                                                 
102
 This seems unlikely since government spending is also biased in favor of coethnics and 
copartisans, and donors presumably would prefer to complement rather than replicate 
government spending.  
103
 These data come from the Ministry of Local Government and CDF Board. Available at 
http://opendata.go.ke/d/2dr6-gdne, accessed September 10, 2011. 
104
 I test this by removing Constituency Budget from the model and reestimating the results. The 
coefficient estimates remain consistent.  
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Table 3: Robustness Checks for the Effect of Victory Margin and Ethnicity on Aid 
  
(1) 
Budget 
Data 
(2) 
Budget 
Data 
(3) 
Disbursed 
Aid 
(4) 
Disbursed 
Aid 
Victory Margin -0.02 
 
0.08** 
   0.10 
 
0.03 
 Co-Ethnic Constituency 
 
0.23* 
 
0.11** 
  
 
0.11 
 
0.03 
Constituency Budget 0.16* 0.13** 
    0.06 0.06 
  Observations 990 990 3753 3,762 
R-Squared 0.27 0.27 0.08 0.08 
+
p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Constituency clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimated using a linear model with constituency-level fixed-effects, regime fixed-
effects, and time trends (constituency fixed effects and regime fixed effects are 
excluded from Models 1 and 2). Included, but not shown, are controls for Percent 
Poverty, Infant Mortality per Capita, GDP (log), Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, 
Land Area, Population (log), and National Tax Revenue.  
 
 
I also run a number of additional robustness checks in the supplementary appendix.
105
 
Supplementary Table A2 estimates these models for the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank separately. The results are consistent for both donors, suggesting that the 
results are not driven by one donor, but are potentially endemic to the overall multilateral aid 
effort in Kenya. Supplementary Table A3 relaxes a number of coding assumptions, dropping 
imprecisely estimated projects among others. Supplementary Table A4 provides estimates using 
alternative coding of the dependent variable, including a constituency’s overall share of aid.106 
Supplementary Table A5 includes year fixed effects and removes all control variables. The 
results for each of these tests remain consistent with the main results. 
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 Alternative dependent variables include the amount of aid in each constituency as a share of 
total aid and the overall amount of aid in a constituency unscaled by population.  
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Does Aid Affect Election Outcomes? 
These results support my claim that aid is electorally strategic, but they do not indicate whether 
incumbents are successful in their efforts to use aid to influence elections. While some scholars 
argue that donors affect election outcomes,
107
 these effects have, to my knowledge, never been 
systematically tested. In order to evaluate this claim (Hypothesis 5), I examine whether 
constituencies in Kenya that receive more aid are also more likely to vote for the incumbent 
party. Specifically, I estimate the following model: 
                        
                                                                                
(8) 
where i indexes constituency and j indexes each five-year election cycle (1993–97, 1998–2002, 
and 2003–7). ElectionVictoryMargin is the victory margin in constituency i for each of the 
elections in j.
108
                             is the total amount of aid per capita provided to 
constituency i in period j.  
 Interpreting the effect of                           on election outcomes is not 
entirely straightforward. As discussed above, an incumbent’s distributional decisions are partly 
determined by his or her distribution of political support, so the distribution of aid is endogenous 
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 Brown 2001; Morrison 2011; Wrong 2009. 
108
 Note that in the 2002 election there was no incumbent presidential candidate since Daniel 
arap Moi declined to contest the election. The incumbent party, however, did contest the 
election, nominating Moi’s chosen successor Kenyatta.  
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to election outcomes. As a result, a simple regression of victory margin on aid would be 
inconclusive and misleading. To address this issue, I include the control variable 
                          , which equals the victory margin of the incumbent in the 
incumbent’s previous election. To the extent incumbents disburse aid in response to the 
preexisting distribution of political support, this variable accounts for the selection bias. To 
account for additional sources of bias, I include the control variables used in prior models and 
fixed effects for constituency    and election cycle   . These account for unobserved election-
specific or constituency-specific factors that might confound these results.  
 The results (Table 4) are consistent with the hypothesis that aid improves the 
performance of incumbent parties (Hypothesis 5). As shown in Figure 8, an increase in aid from 
the minimum to the maximum level in a constituency increases the estimated victory margin of 
an incumbent in that constituency by about 16 percentage points. Admittedly, there are some 
reasons to be skeptical of this estimate since whether or not the coefficient on aid is biased by 
unobserved political variables is uncertain.
109
 Even a slightly attenuated effect would have an 
important consequence for Kenya’s political history. Given how close the past few elections 
have been, a few percentage points either way could have altered an election outcome.
110
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 While I control for the prior distribution of political support, it remains possible that 
governments adjust their distributional decisions in unobserved ways during their tenure in 
response to a changing political map. Since these distributional decisions would be correlated 
with election outcomes, it is possible that this is an overestimate of the actual effect. 
110
 The difference in the percentage of votes obtained by Odinga and Kibaki in the 2007 
presidential election was about 2 percent, and significant disagreement remains over who 
actually won the election. In the 2013 election, a shift of less than 1 percent would have forced a 
runoff.  
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Table 4: The Effect of Aid on Election Outcomes 
  
(1)  
ElectionVictoryMargin 
Total Aid per Capita 3.76* 
  1.58 
ElectionVictoryMargint-1 0.56** 
  0.04 
Observations 591 
R-Squared 0.48 
+
p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Constituency clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. Estimated using a linear model with constituency-level 
fixed-effects and election cycle fixed-effects. Included, but not 
shown, are controls for Percent Poverty and Population (log). Other 
controls are omitted due to colinearity with fixed effects.  
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Figure 8: The Effect of Aid on Election Outcomes
 
 
Estimates are simulated from the fixed-effects estimates shown in Table 4. 
Estimated dollar amounts are in 2000 USD.  The shaded area shows the 
95% confidence interval for these predictions.   
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Discussion 
Aid critics often point out that aid has not fulfilled its promises of development and poverty 
alleviation.
111
 One of the most frequently cited explanations for this failure is that aid fuels 
patronage and corruption rather than development—yet the mechanisms by which governments 
use aid as a political tool remains poorly understood. Part of the reason for this theoretical gap 
may be historical: foreign aid in the 1970s and ’80s often went to kleptocratic governments, 
many of which were more interested in maximizing the wealth of the elite than fueling their 
nation’s economic development. As a result, much of the literature on foreign aid politics has 
focused on ways in which democratic institutions can constrain kleptocratic behavior, rather than 
on the ways in which democratic incentives themselves influence aid allocation.  
Nevertheless, democratic institutions create their own incentives for the politicization of 
aid. Almost all aid today goes to states that have some form of electoral accountability. The 
elections create incentives for governments not just to use aid to maximize the wealth of the 
elite, but also to use it to influence to political behavior. Specifically, incumbents have incentives 
to ensure that any aid money that gets spent in their country goes to individuals most likely to 
respond by delivering votes. I provide compelling evidence in support of this claim using data on 
the geographic distribution of benefits from multilateral aid projects in Kenya from 1992 to 
2010. By taking advantage of temporal variation in regime support, I establish that there is a 
consistent bias in the distribution of aid toward coethnic and copartisan constituencies and away 
from areas with a high number of votes for leading opposition parties. These effects hold even 
under a restrictive difference-in-differences specification. I also show that this bias appears to 
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help incumbents retain power and constituencies that benefit from large amounts of aid have, on 
average, larger victory margins for the incumbent. 
 I argue that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that electoral biases influence aid 
spending in many, if not most, aid-dependent states. However, as many studies note,
112
 the 
nature of these effects vary depending upon the institutional and social environment of a state. In 
Kenya there are strong institutional incentives for incumbents to use aid as a means to retain their 
ethnic coalition. In states with stronger levels of partisanship and weaker patron-client 
relationships, biases in favor of swing voters or in favor of specific economic sectors or regions 
might be observed.
113
  
 While recognizing the need to be cautious in generalizing these results outside of Kenya, 
important conclusions for aid research and policy can be drawn. First, the results suggest that 
development outcomes can be thwarted not just by kleptocratic behavior, but also by the 
diversion of aid for electoral reasons. While elections may improve accountability, the 
distributional incentives that elections impose on governments may not always align with good 
development. Ironically, given donor investment in electoral institutions, these electoral 
incentives may help explain some of the disconnect between donor intentions and outcomes.  
Second, these findings also suggest that care be taken when interpreting the effects of political 
institutions, such as democracy, on aid effectiveness. While democracy may improve the 
accountability of government, it also creates greater incentives for development funds to be used 
as a way to influence political behavior. As a result, the growing focus on giving aid to 
democratic governments in developing countries may have unintended consequences—while it 
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may reduce kleptocratic behavior, it can increase other forms of aid misallocation, such as that 
explored here.  
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